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Increasing Police Accountability: Restoring Trust and
Legitimacy Through the Appointment of Independent
Prosecutors
Kami Chavis Simmons*

INTRODUCTION

Immediately following the shooting death of Michael Brown in
Ferguson, Missouri and the death of Eric Gardner at the hands of a
New York City Police Department officer, criminal justice advocates
called for greater measures to hold police officers accountable for
their actions.' For many observers, the failure to secure criminal
indictments against the officers involved in each of these deaths of
unarmed citizens suggested various shortcomings in the criminal
justice system. 2 In the wake of these and other deaths, President
Obama signed an order establishing the President's Task Force on
21st Century Policing, a body of scholars, practitioners, and
policymakers that would examine ways to improve trust between
communities and police. 3 Yet in the weeks following the release of
* Professor of Law and Director of the Criminal Justice Program, Wake Forest
University School of Law. B.A. University of North Carolina; J.D. Harvard Law School. 1
would like to thank Ashley Brompton and Amanda Whorton for providing valuable research
assistance.
1. More than a dozen states are considering legislation aimed at increasing police
accountability following the deaths. Reid Wilson, Police Accountability Measures Flood State
LegislaturesAfter Ferguson, Staten Island, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.washington
post.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/02/04/police-accountability-measures-flood-state-legislaturesafter-ferguson-staten-island/.
2. See, e.g., Katrina vanden Heuvel, Fixing a Broken Justice System, WASH. POST (Dec.
16, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinionskatrina-vanden-heuvel-fixing-a-brokenjustice-system/2014/12/16/76239b2e-8496-1 e4-b9b7-b8632ae73d25_story.html.
3. Establishment of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 79 Fed. Reg.
246 (Dec. 23, 2014), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-12-23/pdf201430195.pdf; President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing, OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED
POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/policingtaskforce (last
visited May 28, 2015).
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the Task Force's report, a North Charleston, South Carolina police
officer fatally shot Walter Scott in the back, and vigorous protests
erupted in Baltimore, Maryland after Freddie Gray died of injuries he
sustained while in police custody.4 These deaths have reignited many
debates about a myriad of reform proposals that police accountability
experts have been discussing for decades. For example, reformers
have urged more officer training focused on de-escalation techniques
and cultural or racial bias.5 Others called for greater statistical
tracking to measure the breadth of the problem of officer-involved
deaths.6 Yet another hotly contested reform proposal involves
requiring police officers to wear body cameras. 7 The NAACP, the
ACLU, and The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
have supported initiatives requiring police to wear body cameras. 8 In
4. Michael S. Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, South Carolina Officer Is Charged With Murder
of Walter Scott, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/us/southcarolina-officer-is-charged-with-murder-in-black-mans-death.html; Scott Malone, Ian Simpson
& Warren Strobel, Marchers Protest Police Violence in Baltimore, New York, REUTERS (Apr.
30, 2015, 2:53 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-police-baltimore-idUSKBNONIlN
720150430. It is argued by some that special prosecutors can dampen or eliminate real and
perceived conflicts of interest that occur when a local office prosecutes a police officer. See,
e.g., Editorial, Police Abuse Cases Need Special Prosecutors, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/police-abuse-cases-need-special-prosecutors/20 14/12/
06/fcf57e28-7cd6-11 e4-b821-503cc7efed9e story.html.
5.

MICHAEL D. WHITE, POLICE OFFICER BODY-WORN CAMERAS: ASSESSING THE

EVIDENCE 10 (2014), available at https://www.ojpdiagnosticcenter.org/sites/default/files/spotight/
See also LINDSAY MILLER,
download/Police%200fficer/o20Body-Wom%20Cameras.pdf.
JESSICA TOLIVER & POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN
CAMERA PROGRAM: RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 48 (2014), available at

http://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p296-pub.pdf.
6. See Arron C. Davis & Wesley Lowery, FBI Director Calls Lack of Data on Police
Shootings "Ridiculous, " "Embarrassing," WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.washington
post.com/national/fbi-director-calls-lack-of-data-on-police-shootings-ridiculous-embarrassing/
2015/10/07/c0ebaf7a-6d 16-11 e5-b3 lc-d80d62b53e28_story.html.
7. See James S. Muller, To Police the Police, Body Cameras are a Must, L.A. TIMES
(May 11, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-muller-body-camera-data-showsunnecessary-force-20150508-story.html. But see Janet Vertesi, The Problem with Police Body
Cameras, TIME (May 4, 2015), http://time.com/3843157/the-problem-with-police-bodycameras/.

8. See Civil Rights Coalition Urges National Reforms and Recommendations to Address
Police Abuse, NAT'L ASS'N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, http://www.naacp.
(last
org/press/entry/civil-rightscoalition-continues-to-urge-national-reforms-and-recommendation
visited May 30, 2015) (describing the Department of Justice's National Initiative for Building
Community Trust and Justice and providing statements from the ACLU, Lawyers' Committee,
and NAACP supporting the program).
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addition, President Obama has proposed that $75 million of federal
money be made available for local law enforcement to purchase and
train officers to use body cameras. 9 Many of these reforms may result
in additional transparency about deaths or serious injuries suffered in
police custody, assist in identifying structural failures and
opportunities to enhance training, and lead to more effective policy
solutions. However, the aforementioned police accountability
measures may not result in punishment of individual officers who
have employed excessive force, because even when seemingly
damning evidence exists, prosecutions of officers have traditionally
been rare and even when officers are prosecuted, convictions are
difficult to secure. 10
Amid the calls for accountability, recent public outrage reached a
fever pitch when officers were not held criminally responsible for
recent high-profile deaths. Numerous advocates noted that local
prosecutors face inherent conflicts of interest and for this reason,
these advocates call for independent agencies or special prosecutors
to prosecute these cases. In particular, the St. Louis County District
Attorney Bob McCulloch received numerous requests to recuse
himself from the prosecution of Officer Darren Wilson for fear that
he would not vigorously seek an indictment." Indeed, once the grand
jury declined to indict Wilson, critics combed the grand jury
9. Nolan Feeney, Obama Requests Funds for Police Body Cameras to Address
'Simmering Distrust' After Ferguson, TIME (Dec. 1, 2014), http://time.com/3613058/obamaferguson-police-body-cameras-funding/.
10. Only forty-one police officers were charged with homicide for an on-duty shooting
from 2004 to 2011. Zusha Elinson & Joe Palazzolo, Police Rarely Criminally Charged for OnDuty Shootings, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 24, 2014, 7:22 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/policerarely-criminally-charged-for-on-duty-shootings- 1416874955.
11. These calls for recusal are based on the fact that McCulloch's father was a police
officer and was shot and killed by an African American man. Leigh Ann Caldwell, Concerns
Arise About Prosecutor in Michael Brown Case, CNN (Aug. 20, 2014, 12:48 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/19/us/ferguson-prosecutor-mcculloch/. For a discussion of the
racial make-up of Ferguson and historic racism in St. Louis, see Wesley Lowery, Carol D.
Leonnig & Mark Berman, Even Before Michael Brown s Slaying in Ferguson, Racial Questions
Hung Over Police, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
even-before-teen-michael-browns-slaying-in-mo-racial-questions-have-hung-over-police20 14/
08/13/78b3c5c6-2307-1 Ie4-86ca-6fD3cbdI 5c la story.html.
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testimony to critique McCulloch's strategy.12 Similarly, Staten Island
District Attorney Daniel Donovan faced criticism over his failure to

indict the officer whose chokehold killed Eric Garner, despite the
existence of videotaped footage in that case.' 3 There was a sense that
many had lost faith in their local prosecutors to be able to set aside

their close relationships with local law enforcement in order to
conduct a fair trial of police officers engaged in alleged misconduct
and excessive use of force. 14 In contrast, jubilant crowds flooded the
streets of Baltimore when the chief prosecutor, Marilyn Mosby,
revealed numerous charges against six officers involved in the death
of Freddie Gray.' 5 Shortly thereafter, many who supported of the
officers called for Mosby's recusal citing her political ties and

criticized the swiftness of her office in levying charges against the
officers.' 6 McCulloch, who is white and whose constituents are
largely white, was criticized because he failed to secure an indictment

for killing an unarmed black man. Mosby, on the other hand, who is
African American, was criticized for bringing charges and there was
'7

a suggestion that she was merely appeasing a largely black
constituency, as well as trying to quell the violence that had broken
out in several of Baltimore's black neighborhoods.' 8 Each of these

cases demonstrates that the criminal prosecution of law enforcement
12. See David Zucchino, Prosecutor'sGrand Jury Strategy in Ferguson Case Adds to
Controversy, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2014, 8:49 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-naferguson-da-analysis-20141126-story.html.
13. Alexander Bums, Daniel Donovan Gets Wary Welcome to Congress After Eric
Garner Case, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/23/nyregion/
daniel-donovan-gets-a-wary-welcome-to-congress-after-eric-gamer-case.html?r=0.
14. Walter Katz, EnhancingAccountability and Trust with Independent Investigations of
Police Lethal Force, 128 HARV. L. REV. 235, 236-37 (2015), available at http://cdn.harvardlaw
review.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/volI 28_Katz.pdf (noting that "[t]he Brown and Garner
cases embodied not only general distrust between police and minority communities, but also the
loss of the public's trust in the investigations and reviews of police-involved deaths.").
15. Alan Blinder & Richard Pdrez-Pefia, 6 Baltimore Police Officers Charged in Freddie
Gray Death, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/02/us/freddie-grayautopsy-report-given-to-baltimore-prosecutors.html?_r-0.
16. See Peter Hermann & Lynh Bui, Defense Lawyers: Marilyn Mosby Should Recuse
Herselffrom Gray Case, WASH. POST (May 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
crime/defense-marilyn-mosby-should-recuse-herself-from-freddie-gray-case/2015/05/08/d701c
51 c-f5c8-11 e4-bcc4-e814 lc5eb0c9_story.html.
17. See Jeffrey Toobin, How Not to Use a Grand Jury, NEW YORKER (Nov. 25, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/use-grand-jury.
18. See Hermann & Bui, supra note 16.
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officers is fraught with actual or potential conflicts of interest and
political issues that threaten to undermine the legitimacy of the
criminal justice system. These issues become more acute when one
considers the implications for racial minorities who have a
longstanding distrust of the criminal justice system. In each instance,
various segments of the local community criticized the local
prosecutor for their actions based on potential conflicts of interest. In
either case, the appointment of an independent prosecutor might have
alleviated the appearance of impropriety and led to greater
confidence in the criminal justice process for both the victims and the
police defendants.
Criminal prosecution of police officers raises a myriad of issues
that this Article will begin to explore. First, while there has been a
paradigmatic shift in police accountability in recent decades from
remedies focusing on individual officers to those focusing on broad
organizational reform, this Article will explore the important role that
the deterrence rationale of criminal prosecution might play as one
tool to address police misconduct. Second, other than deterrence,
criminal prosecutions serve numerous goals, including retribution for
the harms imposed upon the victims and society for the crimes.
Historically, many racial minorities, when compared with their white
counterparts, lack faith in equity and fairness of the criminal justice
system.19 Recent deaths of unarmed blacks at the hands of police and
what many see as a failure to hold the officers accountable, and have
yet again exposed the racial dynamics at play within the criminal
justice system. Part I of this paper summarizes the various tools
currently used to keep police officers accountable for their actions,
and contextualizes criminal prosecution as one tool in the toolkit of
police accountability-one blade on the Swiss-army knife needed to
achieve effective and sustainable police accountability. Part II will
argue that the current manner in which many local prosecutions
proceed, which is replete with potential (and inherent) conflicts of
interest, undermines both the deterrence rationale and public
confidence in whether both victims and police officers are treated

19. Bill Schneider, Do Americans Trust Their Cops to Be Fair and Just? New Poll
Contains Surprises., REUTERS (Jan. 15, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/01/
15/one-third-of-americans-believe-police-lie-routinely/.
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fairly when local prosecutors are responsible for investigating and
deciding whether to criminally charge officers. This part will explore
the challenges and dangerous implications of the current model. Part
III of this Article will explore the merits of several proposals to
reform this process, focusing primarily upon the appointment of
independent prosecutors rather than local ones to investigate and
prosecute police-involved deaths. °
I. ASSESSING CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AS A PROPER TOOL IN THE
POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TOOLKIT

The deaths of Michael Brown, Eric Gardner, Walter Scott, and
Freddie Gray at the hands of police have become symbolic of the
need for increased police accountability in the United States.
Although there is no comprehensive national database on policeinvolved shootings, one group estimates that in 2015 there were 1138
deaths at the hands of police. 2' One study showed that 490 people
were killed by police between January and June 11, 2015, and that
138 of the victims were African American (which means that
although blacks constitute 12 percent of the U.S. population, they
accounted for nearly 30 percent of those killed by police officers in
the first half of this past year).22 Between January and August 2015,
police killed 55 unarmed African Americans and the rates of police
violence are much higher against African Americans (7.18 per
million) versus whites (2.92 per million).23 In a 2014 study, New
York City's Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) found that
20. Following the failure of the grand juries to indict the police officers involved in deaths
of both Michael Brown and Eric Gardner, some critics argued that independent prosecutors
should be appointed to replace the decision making power of grand juries in these cases. This
paper does not explore models a model that would usurp the power of the grand jury, but rather
examines the merits and disadvantages of appointing an independent prosecutor to investigate
or prosecute the case rather than the local prosecutor.
21. This number is accurate as of December 22, 2015. The Counted: People Killed by
Police in the U.S., THE GUARDIAN, http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/

jun/01/the-counted-police-killings-us-database
Counted].
22.

(last visited Dec. 22, 2015) [hereinafter The

Peniel E. Joseph, The Number of Times African-Americans Were Brutalized by Police

This Year, REUTERS (June 11, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/06/l1/thenumber-times-black-people-were-brutalized-by-police-this-year-unknown/.
23.

The Counted,supra note 21.
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while African Americans made up 23 percent of the city's
population, they represented 55 percent of reported victims of alleged
misconduct from 2008 to 2013.24
As the recent events make clear, these individual acts of police
violence demonstrate that these events often are symptomatic of a
larger problem plaguing local police departments nationwide. It is
well-established that police violence is generally a product of
organizational or institutional factors that influence police
departments rather than individual officers. Thus, effective remedies
need to strike at the heart of police culture in order to deter
misconduct of individual police officers, but should also address
systemic issues within these institutions that might contribute to
police misconduct.
A. The Current "Toolkit" to Address Police Misconduct
Throughout history, numerous remedies aimed at curbing police
misconduct and increasing accountability have included both external
and internal mechanisms. Internal remedies such as internal
investigations are fraught with conflicts, but external oversight
25
measures such as citizen review boards have also faced criticism.
Court-sanctioned remedies such as the exclusionary rule also have
proved inadequate to address police misconduct.26 While civil actions
against officers might offer compensation to a few successful victims,
these suits have not spurred widespread reforms.2 7 The recent deaths
of unarmed citizens in police custody have also sparked new
discussions about the merits and efficacy of criminal prosecutions of

24.

N.Y.C. CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BD., 2013 REPORT (2014), available at

http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/downoads/pdf/CCRB%2OAnnual 2013.pdf

[http://perma.cc/M3

7N-L5BR].
25. See, e.g., James R. Hudson, Police Review Boards and Police Accountability, 36 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 515, 521 (1971).
26. Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62
STAN. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009).
27. For the amount of money jurisdictions spend on civil cases, see Zusha Elinson & Dan
Frosch, Cost of Police-Misconduct Cases Soars in Big U.S. Cities, WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2015,
10:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/cost-of-police-misconduct-cases-soars-in-big-u-s-cities1437013834 (noting that the "10 cities with the largest police departments paid out $248.7
million last year in settlements and court judgments in police-misconduct cases, up 48% from
$163.3 million in 2010 ... ").
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police officers.28 It seems clear that new tools are needed in order to
protect citizens, especially the most vulnerable, from the increasingly
visible transgressions of the police.
B. Why are State and FederalCriminalProsecutionsof Law
Enforcement Officers So Rare?
Although the recent trend in policing has focused upon
organizational change and forward-looking reforms to prevent future
instances of police misconduct, police officers who may have acted
outside of the legal boundaries to effectuate a stop, search, or arrest
of a subject can face criminal prosecution either at the state or the
federal level. The deaths of Michael Brown, Eric Garner, and others
have also caused a public outcry for criminal prosecution of the
officers involved in those deaths, and the failure of prosecutors to
secure indictments in either of these cases has highlighted the
shortcomings of criminal prosecution as a viable tool to address
police misconduct. While advocates continue to press for widespread
changes in law enforcement practices, there has also been an
increased focus on examining the current models of criminally
prosecuting officers. Criminal prosecutions of police officers are
uncommon and judges and juries often exonerate the few officers
who face prosecution.2 9
But what accounts for the failure to prosecute or convict police
officers accused of using excessive force? The failure to indict
officers in Michael Brown's death and the death of Eric Garner
renewed the debate about why police officers rarely face criminal
charges for their roles in police-related deaths. Many experts note
that there is an "inherent conflict of interest that exists between the
prosecutors' offices and the police officers upon whose work the
28. See Kimberly Kindy & Kimbriell Kelly, Thousands Dead, Few Prosecuted, WASH.
POST (Apr. 11, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/04/lI /thousandsdead-few-prosecuted/.
29. State criminal prosecutions resulting from violations of state laws against assault,
aggravated assault, manslaughter and murder are another method of holding police officers
accountable. See John V.Jacobi, Prosecuting Police Misconduct, 2000 WiS. L. REV. 789, 803
(2000) (discussing the reluctance of police officers to pursue investigations of fellow officers'
misconduct) [hereinafter Jacobi].
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prosecutors rely."30 It has long been argued that the primary reason
local prosecutors are hesitant to pursue cases that involve police
officers is due to the close relationships between prosecutors and
officers.3 ' Although prosecutors conduct the investigations alone and
officers respond to the crimes alone, they depend on each other and
work as a team. 32 Prosecutors depend on officers for information,
witnesses, and evidence making their relationships ongoing. 33 The
potential conflicts of interest extend beyond the ability to secure
police witnesses for trials. For example, more than 80 percent of local
prosecutors are elected, and they not only work closely with police to
investigate and punish crimes, but also often depend on police union
endorsements to win and keep their jobs.34 Thus local prosecutors are
heavily influenced not to make decisions that would anger those
35
unions.
II.

SHARPENING THE TOOL OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION-WHY
HOLDING OFFICERS CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE MATTERS

A. A Dearth of Prosecutions Where Appropriate Undermines the
Rationale of CriminalPunishment
While all of the methods to address police misconduct have
shortcomings, a failure to prosecute police officers who may have
used excessive force has broader implications for the criminal justice
system. When there is a criminal violation, there are generally two
overarching theories to justify punishing the offender. Punishment is
based on either retribution, a "backward" looking theory that is
focused on the crime itself and emphasizes the concept that the

30. Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration
in the Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
489, 501 (citing Jacobi,supranote 29, at 789).
31. Jacobi, supranote 29, at 803.
32. Id. at 803-04.
33. ld. at 803.
34. Editorial Board, Reform Prosecuting Police Misconduct: Our View, USA TODAY
(Dec. 10, 2014 6:37 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2Ol4/12/10/eric-gamerstaten-island-police-district-attomey-editorials-debates/20216333/.
35. Id.
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offender deserves punishment, or 36on utilitarianism, which focuses on
deterring future criminal conduct.
In regards to police shootings, officers are rarely prosecuted,
suggesting a sense that the police are often above reproach in such
situations. A recent Washington Post analysis of fatal police
shootings between 2005 and 2015, showed that despite thousands of
shootings, only fifty-four officers were criminally prosecuted.37
Bowling Green State University criminologist Philip M. Stinson and
The Washington Post identified the fifty-four prosecutions and the
cases were gleaned from news reports, grand jury announcements and
news releases from prosecutors.38
More generally, evidence also shows a large disparity between
officers who are accused of committing crimes, and the number who
are actually charged or convicted for those crimes. For example, a
study regarding prosecution of police officers from April 2009 until
December 2010 showed that during that time 8,300 credible reports
were filled against nearly 11,000 officers, but of those reports only
3,238 resulted in criminal charges.39 Of those 3,238 officers only
1,063 officers were convicted, and only 36 percent of those convicted
were actually incarcerated. 40 The study provided detailed graphs
comparing the conviction and incarceration rates of law enforcement
and the general public. Conviction rates showed that nearly 70
percent of the general public was convicted, while about 35 percent
of officers were convicted.4' Similarly the incarceration rates showed
that nearly 70 percent of the general public was incarcerated for their
crimes, while only about 35 percent of law enforcement officers were
incarcerated for their crimes.42
36. John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3,4-5 (1955).
37. Kimberly Kindy & Kimbriell Kelly, Thousands Dead, Few Prosecuted,WASH. POST
(Apr. 11, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/04/1I /thousands-deadfew-prosecuted/.
38. Id.
39. David Packman, 2010 NPMSRP Police Misconduct Statistical Report-Draft, CATO
INST. (Apr. 5, 2011, 12:55 AM), http://www.policemisconduct.net/2010-npmsrp-police-misconductstatistical-report/.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.

2015]

Increasing Police Accountability

This data revealed similar findings when focusing specifically on
cases involving excessive force.43 The report found that 2,716
officers were accused of using excessive force, but only about 200 of
those officers were charged. Of those charged, only 77 officers were
convicted. 44 Of the officers accused of using excessive force, 430
officers were accused of killing a person but only 30 officers were
charged, and only half of those 30 where convicted.45 In some areas,
police are rarely prosecuted at all. For example, in Florida an officer
had not been charged with shooting a civilian in twenty years.46
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund chief litigator,
Christina Swarns, argued that in cases of police shootings, the
interests of prosecutors may not always align with victims, but rather
with the police they work "'hand in hand' with, and has urged
greater independence.47 Notably, from January 2009 through
November 2011, Chicago had 441 misconduct cases (75 percent were
excessive force and wrongful arrest cases) that led to paid settlements
to victims-however not one of those cases led to an indictment or
conviction, showing that cities rarely wish to admit their
wrongdoings.4 8
B. A Failureto ProsecuteOfficers Undermine Public Confidence in
Investigations of Officer-Involved Deaths
Historically, studies have demonstrated shown that when
compared with their white counterparts, African Americans have less
confidence in police officers and do not believe that police treat racial
minorities fairly. A recent Reuters poll shows that only 28 percent of
African American trust police to be fair and just, while 61 percent of
whites believe police to be fair and just. These figures elucidate deep
racial divisions regarding the legitimacy of the criminal justice
43.

Adeshina Emmanuel, Indictments, Convictions of Police Officers in Civilian Deaths

Rare, CHI. REP. (Nov. 6, 2014), http://chicagoreporter.com/indictments-convictions-poice-officerscivilian-deaths-rare/.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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system in the United States. At a time when blacks are
disproportionately incarcerated, many of whom are jailed for nonviolent drug crimes, it seems anathema to many that a fair and
impartial justice system would allow police officers to escape
punishment or condemnation for the violence visited upon unarmed
racial minorities. As one commentator noted regarding the deaths of
Brown and Garner, "[b]road cross-sections of the public have lost
trust in local law enforcement agencies due to their perception of
biased investigations of such deadly-force incidents. '49

III. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
In the wake of a number of deaths of unarmed black men at the
hands of police officers, President Obama appointed the President's
Task Force on 21st Century Policing to examine ways in which to
increase police accountability and promote public safety. The Task
Force's report specifically noted that the use of independent
prosecutors to review "cases of inappropriate deadly force" will help
50
to build "mutual trust between community and law enforcement.,
A. IndependentInvestigations
When there is a death in police custody, many police departments
conduct an internal investigation. Typically, the results of the
investigation are disclosed to local prosecutors who will then decide
whether to pursue criminal charges against the officers involved.
Internal investigations can be a valuable tool for a police department
because they not only provide an opportunity for the department to
learn about how officers behave in certain circumstances, and but a
properly run division responsible for internal oversight could signal
to officers that the department takes allegations of misconduct
seriously. However, these internal police investigations often lack
transparency, and the public is generally distrustful of allowing
officers within the same department to investigate their fellow
49.

Katz, supranote 14, at 236-37.

50.

OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., FINAL REPORT
r

OF THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21 CENTURY POLICING 21 (2015), available at
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce-finalreport.pdf.
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officers. 5' Officers who investigate other officers within the same
department, even if they are in entirely within the office, face

inherent conflicts of interest, and may not want to be seen as
violating the "code of silence" endemic in police culture or breaching
the loyalty they have to fellow officers.52
Therefore, in addition to internal investigations, state legislation
should also mandate an independent investigation of deaths in police
custody. In 2014, Wisconsin became the first state to mandate outside

investigators with respect to officer-involved shootings.53 Currently
Wisconsin is one of the only states to mandate an independent
investigation of an officer-involved death. The Wisconsin law
provides that "each agency shall have a written policy regarding the
investigation of officer-involved deaths that involve a law
enforcement officer employed by the law enforcement agency." 54 The
law further requires an investigation conducted by at least two
investigators, one of whom is the lead investigator and neither of
whom is employed by a law enforcement agency that employs a law
enforcement officer involved in the officer-involved death., 55 While
5 1. These investigations are often perceived as illegitimate because of the conflicts of
interest existing among the officers and those assigned to investigate them. For example, Paul
Chevigny notes that in the Internal Affairs Division of New York City's Police Department,
"[s]uperior officers did not want to root out corruption, both because it might threaten their jobs
and because they wanted to maintain a good image for the department." PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE
OF THE KNIFE:

POLICE VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAS 79-80 (1995). The Danziger Bridge

shooting in the wake of Hurricane Katrina provides one example of how officers in the same
department failed to properly investigate officers involved in a shooting. After several officers
shot several unarmed citizens crossing the bridge, the supervisors who were called to
investigate the scene participated in a cover-up and ultimately faced criminal prosecution
themselves. See New Orleans Cops Convicted in Post-KatrinaShootings Case, CNN (Aug. 5,
2011, 3:44 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011 /CRIME/08/05/louisiana.danziger.bridge.shooting/.
52. The blue code of silence also makes it difficult for investigating officers to gather
information regarding alleged instances of police misconduct. See also Myriam E. Gilles,
Breakingthe Code of Silence: Rediscovering "Custom " in Section 1983 MunicipalLiability, 80
B.U. L. REV. 17, 84-85 (2000) (discussing the lack of cooperation experienced by police
officers investigating their fellow officers).
53. See In Wisconsin, a Decade Old Shooting Leads to New Law, NPR (Dec. 15, 2014,
1:27 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/12/13/370592433/in-wisconsin-a-decade-old-police-shootingleads-to-new-law; See also Candice Bernd, Wisconsin Passes First State Law Requiring
Independent Investigations of Police Custody Deaths, TRUTHOUT (May 3, 2014, 9:10 AM),
http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/23463-wisconsin-passes-first-state-law-requiring-independentinvestigations-of-police-custody-deaths.
54. See A.B. 409 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2013).
55. Id.
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many local jurisdictions follow a similar protocol regarding deaths in
custody, Wisconsin is one of the only states to currently mandate that
an independent body investigate these deaths.5 6
In October 2014, state legislator Reed Gusciora introduced similar
legislation in New Jersey. 57 Many states already use state agencies
such as the State Bureau of Investigation or the Attorney General's
office to take responsibility for the investigation but do not require
that these agencies take responsibility for the investigation of officer
involved uses of force or death. Connecticut also has an independent
prosecutor law. This law requires that the state's Division of Criminal
Justice investigate any police-involved death and allows the state's58
chief attorney to appoint a special prosecutor if he or she sees fit.
Missouri Senator Jamilah Nasheed and Missouri Representative Jay
Barnes have offered legislation that would require a special
prosecutor to head up all investigations of police-involved deaths.5 9
On July 8, New York Governor, Andrew Cuomo, at the request of
New York's Attorney General, Eric Schneiderman, issued Executive
Order No. 147, which appoints the New York State Attorney General
as a special prosecutor in matters relating to the deaths of unarmed
civilians caused by law enforcement officers. This order will also
allow the special prosecutor to review cases where there is a question
whether the civilian was armed and dangerous at the time of his or
her death. 60 Thus, the order does not cover all police killings, but only
those where a suspect was unarmed or whether there was a question
about whether the suspect was armed. 61 After the announcement,
56. Holly Yan & Ashley Fantz, Police Kill Teen: Why Wisconsin's Investigation Will Be
Different, CNN (Mar. 10, 2015, 12:48 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/10/us/wisconsinpolice-shooting-rules/.
57. The New Jersey Law requires "two independent persons to investigate an act or
mission by a police officer, which directly results in the death of an individual." A. 3756, 216th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2014). Those individuals must be, "employed by the county prosecutor of
a county other than where the fatal incident occurred." Id.
58. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 51-277(a) (2012).
59. Mike Lear, MO Rep, Sen Want Special Prosecutors in All Police Shootings,
MISSOURINET (Oct. 13, 2014), http://www.missourinet.com/2014/10/13/two-mo-lawmakers-

want-special-prosecutors-in-all-officer-involved-shootings/.
60. Noah Remnick, Cuomo 's Orderfor Special Prosecutorin Police Deaths Is Criticized,
July 9, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/09/nyregion/cuomos-order-for-special-prosecutorin-police-deaths-is-criticized.htmL
61. Id.
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critics were quick to note concerns about whether "that there will be
pressure on a special prosecutor to indict an officer for the62sake of
public perception and that does not serve the ends of justice.,
B. Models of Independent Prosecutors
Even once an investigation is complete, there still exists the
question as to whether the officer(s) involved in the shooting will
face criminal prosecution, and there are many hurdles to securing
criminal convictions for officers accused of excessive uses of force.
The first step often involves the local prosecutor's decision whether
to charge the officer with a crime. As with all criminal cases, the
prosecutor enjoys wide (and often unfettered) discretion regarding
whether to impose criminal charges.63 Prosecutors and police officers
work as part of the same team and inevitably develop a close
relationship--prosecutors rely on police officers to investigate cases,
interrogate suspects, and testify at trial, and police officers rely on
prosecutors to turn their arrests into convictions. 64 Put simply,
prosecutors need the cooperation of the police to win cases. Thus
prosecutors may face a conflict of interest because it may be difficult
for them to bring successful prosecutions if they have to send their
key witnesses, the police officers, to prison for an officer-involved
death.6 5 Therefore, it may be unrealistic to expect even the best
to remain unbiased when they have to prosecute a
district attorney
66
police officer.

Given that local prosecutors will rely heavily upon police officers
within the same department to assist with their investigation of other
62. Jospeh Schatt, NY Governor Names Special Prosecutorfor Killings by Police, CNN
(quoting
(July 9, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/09/us/new-york-special-prosecutor/

Patrick Lynch, head of the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association).
63.

See Rachel Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy,

121 HARV. L. REv. 1332, 1351-53 (2007-08) (discussing how courts do not review
prosecutorial charging decisions).
64. Paul Butler, Op-Ed., The System Must Counteract Prosecutors' Natural Sympathies
for Cops, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/12/04/do-

cases-like-eric-gamers-require-a-special-prosecutor/the-system-must-counteract-prosecutorsnatural-sympathies-for-cops
65. Id.
66. Letitia James, Prosecutorsand Police: The Inherent Conflict in Our Courts, MSNBC
(Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/prosecutors-police-inherent-conflict-our-courts.
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cases, inherent conflicts of interest exist. 67 Similarly, many local
District Attorneys are elected, and prosecuting police officers might
damage their reputation with a large part of the electorate. Many of
their endorsements come from law enforcement unions, which could
impact their chances for reelection.6 8 Even though prosecutors have
an ethical obligation to ignore such considerations, the risk that these
apparent conflicts may play a role in their decision or ability to
effectively prosecute the case against an officer too great to ignore.69
In addition to prosecutions under state law, the federal
government also has the ability to prosecute officers who are accused
of excessive uses of force pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 242. Section 242
provides that it is unlawful for a person acting "under color of any
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, [to] willfully subject []
any inhabitant of any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession or
District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United
States. 7 ° 'While the possibility of federal intervention removes the
local prosecutor, and thus the conflict of interest, federal officials
have agreed that state prosecution is the preferred avenue for criminal
prosecutions of law enforcement officers, and therefore federal
intervention should serve only as a "back-stop. '71 Accordingly,
67. See Jacobi, supranote 29, at 803.
68. William Lynch Ill, Why We Need Independent Prosecutors, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr.
27, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/-william-lynch-iii/why-we-need-independent-p_b
7153826.html. For example, the Staten Island District Attorney, Daniel Donovan received
campaign donations from a number of organizations closely connected with law enforcement
including the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, the Detectives' Endowment Association, the
Sergeants Benevolent Association, the Captains Endowment Association, the Lieutenants
Benevolent Association, the Correction Officers Benevolent Association, the Bridge and
Tunnels Superior Officers Council, the Bridge and Tunnel Officers Benevolent Association,
and the Fraternal Order of Police. Id.
69. This issue was of particular concern in the Michael Brown shooting. In this case,
many community members believed that the prosecutors' ties to law enforcement were too
close and the apparent conflicts of interest delegitimized his role from the beginning. Elizabeth
Chuck, Prosecutorin Michael Brown Case Has Deep Family Ties to Police, NBC NEWS (Aug.
20, 2014, 10:18 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/michael-brown-shooting/prosecutormichael-brown-case-has-deep-family-ties-police-n 183911.
70. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2000).
71. See Police Brutality: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,102d Cong. 3 (1991) (recording testimony of John R.
Dunne, then-Assistant Att'y Gen., Civ. Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice).
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federal prosecutions for excessive force are extremely rare, and local
prosecutors thereby retain exclusive control over the vast majority
cases against police officers accused of excessive force.72
Given these inherent conflicts of interest, in order to assure public
confidence in criminal proceedings involving police officers and
deadly uses of force, reformers have called for the appointment of
"special prosecutors" or "independent prosecutors" to prosecute these
cases at the local level.73 There are several models of independent
prosecution that might achieve greater confidence regarding criminal
prosecutions of officers who are accused of excessive uses of force.
First, similar to independent investigationsof such cases, many states
already have rules that allow the State Attorney General or another
independent body to prosecute controversial cases.74 States could
pass legislation that would mandate automatic referral of all such
cases to an independent or special prosecutor, instead of relying on
the discretion of authorities to determine which cases a special
prosecutor will hear.75 According to Congressional Research Services
legal analysis, Connecticut is one of the only states that currently
requires the appointment of a special prosecutor in police-related
deadly use of force incidents, but other states' lawmakers are quickly
moving to introduce similar legislation.76 For example, a
72. The Justice Department's Civil Rights Division, during President Obama's
administration, prosecuted 385 police officers for civil rights violations. Bob Egelko, Obama
Team More Likely Than Predecessorsto Prosecute Police, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 21, 2014, 7:56
AM), http://www.sfgate.com/crime/articlelObama-team-more-likey-than-predecessors-to-5702851.
php. In addition to the infrequency of federal prosecutions, is also notoriously difficult to secure
successful prosecutions in federal cases because the federal law requires the prosecutor to
establish the officer "willfully" violated the victim's rights, which is a high burden to
demonstrate. See 18 U.S.C. § 242.
73. See also The Editorial Board Police Abuse Cases Need Special Prosecutors, WASH.
POST (Dec. 6, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/police-abuse-cases-need-special-

prosecutors/2014/12/06/fcf57e28-7cd6-1l e4-b821-503 cc7efed9e story.html.
74. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 147 (N.Y. 2015), available at https://www.governor.ny.
gov/sites/govemor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/EO147.pdf. A recent Editorial in the New York
Times called this model the "best solution." The Editorial Board, A Crisis of Confidence in
Prosecutors,N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/20l4/12/09/opinion/a-crisisof-confidence-in-prosecutors.html? r=0 [hereinafter Crisisin Confidence]
75. Crisis in Confidence,supra note 74.
76. Special Prosecutors:Investigationsand Prosecutions of Police Use of Deadly Force,
FAS.ORG (Dec. 12, 2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/specpro.pdf (citing CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 51-277(a) (2012)). See also Haygood to Seek Independent Prosecutorfor Deadly-
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Pennsylvania lawmaker plans to introduce legislation that would
require the state attorney general to appoint an independent special
prosecutor whenever a police officer is involved in a deadly force
incident.77
Another option would be for states to establish permanent
independent prosecutors offices and pass legislation that would allow
authorities to refer officer-involved fatalities to this office for
investigation and/or prosecution. This option seems less viable for
some jurisdictions because establishing a separate office to review
these cases might seem inefficient if the area has an infrequent
amount of police-related deaths. This option, however, might be an
attractive option for larger municipalities that experience multiple
officer-involved fatalities per year.
C. Critiquingthe Independent ProsecutorModel
While many believe that the appointment of independent
prosecutors is necessary to ensure an unbiased and fair investigation,
there are others who question whether independent prosecutors will
indeed remain independent.78 Some observers have noted that by
their very nature, prosecutors may be limited by an "us-versus-them"
viewpoint.7 9 Similarly, some district attorneys have vocally opposed
the idea of independent prosecutors, stating that as district attorney,
they would not hesitate to prosecute an officer to the fullest extent of
the law and that remaining independent in spite of political pressures
is, in fact, the purpose of electing a district attorney. 80 Critics of

Force Incidents, PA SENATE (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.pasenate.com/2014/12/19/haywood-toseek-independent-prosecutor-for-deadly-force-incidents/ [hereinafter Independent Prosecutor].
77. Independent Prosecutor,supra note 76.
78. Delores Jones-Brown, Special Prosecutors are Useful, but Not a GuaranteeAgainst
Prejudice, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2014, 2:58 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/
12/04/do-cases-like-eric-gamers-require-a-special-prsecutr/special-prsecutrs-are-useful-but
-not-a-guarantee-against-prejudice.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Larry Miller, Use of Independent Prosecutors Bothers Philly D.A., PHILA.
TRIB. (Mar. 5, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.phillytrib.com/news/use-of-independentand Jeff
prosecutors-bothers-philly-d-a/article-b7642718-b5a7-5b6a-bdl3-cc8abb6l48aO.html;
Rosen, The Role of Prosecutors in Officer-Involved Shootings, SANTA CLARA U. MARKKULA
CENTER FOR APPLIED ETHICS, http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/focusareas/government
ethics/prosecutor-role.html (last visited May 27, 2015).
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independent prosecutors have also noted that it would be wrong to
blame the prosecutor for the grand jury's decision not to indict.8" It is
ultimately up to the grand jury to decide the officer's fate, and it is
not the82prosecutor's fault if a jury gives the officer the benefit of the
doubt.
There is historical precedent for appointing independent
prosecutors to maintain the integrity of criminal investigation or
prosecution where actual or potential conflicts of interest might exist.
Unfortunately, several high-profile cases in which a special
prosecutor was appointed remind us that this model is also
susceptible to abuse. Appointing an independent prosecutor has been
the subject of controversy since Richard Nixon's Watergate
scandal.8 3 While independent prosecutors date back to 1875, the most
notable instance of the use of a special prosecutor is in the aftermath
of Watergate. 84 After the public lost trust in the government,
Congress enacted the Independent Counsel Act in 1978, which called
for the use of a special prosecutor any time allegations were brought
against high officials in the executive branch, including the President
and his cabinet members. 85 The Independent Counsel Act, amidst
criticism, was upheld as constitutional.8 6 Those who lauded the Act
suggested that it helped "uncover the truth behind allegations of
criminal wrongdoing," and ensured accountability. 87 Others believe
that the Act "vindicated the public trust" in the system to conduct fair
investigations.88 Still others have suggested that it helped maintain
the system of checks and balances, because otherwise, "members of
81. Heather MacDonald, Op-Ed., District Attorneys Have Shown They Can Prosecute
Police, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2015, 10:42 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/
12/04/do-cases-like-eric-garners-require-a-special-prosecutor/district-attorneys-have-shown-theycan-prosecute-police.
82. Id.
83. Alexander I. Tachmes, Independent Counsels Under the Ethics in Government Act of
1978: A Violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine or an Essential Check on Executive

Power?, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 735, 736 (1988).
84. Donald C. Smaltz, The Independent Counsel Act: A View From Inside, 86 GEO. L.J.
2307, 2310-11 (1998).
85. Id. at 2310, 2320.
86. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
87. Smaltz, supra note 84, at 2368.
88. John Q. Barrett, Independent Counsel Law Improvements for the Next Five Years, 51
ADMIN. L. REv. 631, 635-36 (1999).

Journal of Law & Policy

[Vol. 49:137

the executive branch will be responsible for the89prosecution of other
executive officers, a stark a conflict of interest.,
The Independent Counsel Act provided that the Attorney General
can launch a preliminary investigation against any person covered by
the Act who may have violated federal criminal law. 90 Those covered
under the Act include the President, Vice President, the CIA Director,
members of Congress, and other high-ranking officials. 9' If the
Attorney General believes that further investigation is needed, he or
she can call for the appointment of independent counsel.92 The
independent counsel has authority to fully investigate and prosecute
the matter. 93 Their investigative and prosecutorial duties include
proceedings before a grand jury, court proceedings and litigation,
appealing court decisions, and reviewing evidence. 94 After Kenneth
Starr's controversial investigation of Clinton after the Monica
Lewinsky scandal, there were calls to reform the statute. 95 One
commentator noted that "To the horror of civil libertarians and
others, Starr and his cohorts engaged in brutal tactics in their quest
for the scalp of a sitting president" and noted that it was "unlikely
that a 'regular' federal prosecutor, as opposed to this 'special one,'
could've gotten away with such a rampage through due process,
fairness and ordinary decency.', 96 In 1999, Congress allowed the
statute to lapse and there is currently no federal independent
prosecutor's statute.97
Similarly, Heather MacDonald notes particular difficulties that
occurred in the context of special prosecutors appointed to prosecute
89. Tachmes, supra note 83, at 764.
90. 28 U.S.C. § 591(a) (1994).
91. Id.§ 591(b)-(c).
92. Id.§ 592(c).
93. Id.§ 593(b)(3).
94. Id.§ 594(a) (2012). See also Jack Maskell, The Independent Counsel Law, 45 FED.
LAW. 28, 34 (1998) (discussing the provisions of the Act).
95. Joseph S. Hall, Nicholas Pullen & Kandace Rayos, Independent Counsel
Investigations,36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 809, 814 (1999).
96. Harvey Silvergate, Op-Ed., A Special Prosecutor Is a Bad Idea with Unintended
Consequences, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2014, 2:58 PM), http://www.nytimes.con/roomfordebate/
2014/12/04/do-cases-like-eric-gamers-require-a-special-prosecutor/a-specia-prosecutor-is-a-badidea-with-unanticipated-consequences.
97. 28 U.S.C. § 599 (1994).
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98
police and argues that the "narrow mandate can lead to abuse.,
Specifically, she recalls that in the wake of the Knapp Commission's
findings of endemic corruption within the New York Police
Department. New York State created a special prosecutor to
prosecute officers involved in misconduct. 99 In this instance, while
many felt that local prosecutors could not fairly prosecute officers
because of their close relationships, the plan backfired, and
"overzealous tactics" by the special prosecutor led to the reversal of
convictions based on entrapment and other improper tactics.1' ° She
also suggests that "[t]he threat of being displaced by a special
prosecutor can also undermine a district attorney's independence"
when politically or ideologically motivated.' 0 ' This serves as a
reminder of the thin line that such prosecutors must walk in these
situations.

CONCLUSION

Standing alone, there is no single remedy that will eliminate
police misconduct. An entire mosaic of reforms will be necessary to
resolve some of the complex issues surrounding police reform in
order to restore the legitimacy that currently is clearly lacking in
many communities. But each tile in the mosaic must be strong and
intact. Strengthening the models of criminal prosecution, by ensuring
that investigations and subsequent prosecutions are conducted
without actual or even the appearance of conflicts of interest will be
an integral step in increasing the legitimacy of the process. Yet,
appointing an independent prosecutor is not a panacea and policy
makers must address numerous issues to assess viable alternatives to
local prosecutors. For example, for any proposal to appoint a special
prosecutor, policy makers must address several important questions
about the authority of the prosecutor and the structure and staffing of
such an entity. First, what conditions would trigger the appointment
98. MacDonald, supra note 81.
99. Id.
100.
101.

Id.
Id.
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of a special prosecutor?' 0 2 Would referral be automatic or within the
discretion of a local authority (e.g., the local DA herself, or another
judicial official)? Furthermore, would the independent prosecutor be
available only for officer-involved fatalities or other allegations of
uses of force? Finally, policymakers must consider what types of
qualifications this independent prosecutor should possess. Would a
local prosecutor currently working in a neighboring jurisdiction
suffice or, by virtue of their position, would they experience the same
apparent or actual conflicts of interest that a prosecutor in the same
jurisdiction? Would a cadre of retired prosecutors staff the office,
particularly if the jurisdiction experienced only a small number of
triggering incidents. These questions deserve further study in order to
effectively restore trust and reduce police violence.
102. See generally JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INDEPENDENT COUNSELS,
SPECIAL PROSECUTORS, SPECIAL COUNSELS, AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS (2013), available at
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43112.pdf.

